Daniel Fragiadakis and Daniel Stephenson traveled to Austin, Texas, to present research at the fourth Texas Economic Theory Camp held at the University of Texas at Austin from November 14 – 15, 2015. The purpose of the camp is to foster greater interaction among researchers working in pure and applied economic theory in Texas as well as to provide a forum for scholars to present their current research.

Daniel Stephenson presented his paper “Coordination and Evolutionary Stability in Attacker- Defender Games.” This study investigates the empirical validity of dynamic evolutionary models in continuous-time laboratory experiments with attacker-defender games.

This research studied two treatments: control and coordinated. Consistent with the theory, behavior is tightly clustered around the equilibrium in the control treatment. In the coordinated treatment, however, there are large cyclical deviations from the Nash Equilibrium. These results suggest that coordination incentives can lead to more predictable attacks in attacker-defender games.